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 This study addresses the most salient issues surrounding the tensions between the 
Ethnic Han and Uyghur in the People’s Republic of China from the perspective of the 
nonestablishment.  Using YouTube.com as a source, this study analyzes the videos 
uploaded to that website as well as the commentary associated with the videos, both 
posted by everyday netizens.  This study concludes that many of the issues traditional 
sources have found to be relevant are also prevalent on YouTube.com.  Additionally, this 
study suggests that there is dissatisfaction among the Han on the way the Chinese 
government handles its ethnic policy, especially as it relates to the Uyghur. 
 This study also addresses some of the methodological problems associated with 
using the Internet as a source and YouTube in particular.  This study suggests that while 
attribution can be difficult, if not impossible to ascertain, this peculiarity of the Internet 
also allows for more open and honest discussion of difficult ethnic issues denied 
traditional sources.  It was also concluded that YouTube has the potential to help refine 
and guide the utilization of traditional sources.  This study hopes to have established that 
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Urumqi, Xinjiang, Summer 2009 
 A mandarin speaking man and woman hastily produce a video recorder and point 
it down towards the street several stories below their apartment window. The video image 
is choppy, bouncy, and blurry as the man struggles to get the zoom correct.  The woman 
urges the man to hurry as he attempts to get a clear shot of what is occurring directly in 
front of their apartment complex.  The woman gasps and squeals as she reacts to violence 
on which the camera has not yet focused.   
 Finally, the man has captured the scene.  There are dozens of people in the street 
and there is an orange bus parked askew directly in front of the complex.  Sprawled next 
to the bus, partially on the sidewalk, partially on the street, are two men.  One attempts to 
rise and struggles to his knees.  The woman cries “He can’t move!”  A long metal pipe 
comes from outside the camera’s view and connects with the back of the man’s neck.  
The pipe connects again and the man collapses. 
 The camera is jostled and the image is lost but is regained in time to capture what 
appears to be a woman in a burke wielding a metal pipe repeatedly striking the man’s 
head.  Moments later the man is found to be sitting as he watches the woman pass the 
pipe to an individual who, already having his own, passes the pipe to a second man.  The 
mandarin speaking woman several stories up is crying, fear shaking her voice.  “Were not 





lying in the street.  One shifts his leg, the other lies still.  The camera goes blurry and the 
video ends. 
 This video was entitled “New Xinjiang uygur criminal evidence - civilian 
recorded 75riot violence 2.flv” and can be found on YouTube along with other videos 
depicting episodes of violence that occurred between Han and Uyghurs in Urumqi, the 
capital of China’s northwest province of Xinjiang, during the summer of 2009. 1  Two 
thousand miles away in Guangdong Province, a rumor circulated that several Uyghur 
men had raped two women at the Xuri Toy Factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong Province.  
One of the women later denied the rumor.  In response to the rumor, on June 25, a group 
of Han workers entered a dormitory where Uyghur migrant workers lived and began to 
beat them indiscriminately with iron bars, knives and other crude weapons.  Ten days 
later, hundreds of Uyghurs took to the streets of Urumqi to protest the government’s 
handling of the episode.  Initially the protests were peaceful, but eventually they turned 
violent. 
 Riot police were mobilized and on July 6, Beijing shut down Internet and cell 
phone service in Urumqi.  On the following day, groups of Han roved through the streets 
of Urumqi committing revenge killings.  International media reporting indicated that the 
vigilantes did not trust the government to protect Han residents.  By July 11, the police 
forces had brought the violence under control.2  Casualty estimates, and the breakdown of 
casualties along ethnic lines, differ widely depending on the source of the information.  
One thing appears to be clear; the violence ran along specific ethnic lines, Han-Uyghur. 
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 “New Xinjiang uygur criminal evidence - civilian recorded 75riot violence 2.flv,” YouTube, Last 
accessed December 2, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h9r_yPGkUT0.2, 2010.  
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 The above video’s title “New Xinjiang uygur criminal evidence - civilian 
recorded 75riot violence 2.flv” requires some decryption.  “75riot violence” refers to 
violence occurring on July 5, 2009.  “Civilian” refers to the source of the footage; the 
individual that uploaded this video on YouTube appears to be emphasizing that the video 
footage was acquired by a nongovernmental source.  What the YouTube poster probably 
meant to imply by using the term “civilian” was “authentic” or “reliable” or “trustworthy.”  
He most likely wants the audience to believe that footage generated by a governmental 
source might distort the facts to support a political agenda, while this footage was caught 
and posted by an individual that purportedly had no agenda.  “Uygur criminal evidence” 
is another loaded segment of the title.  This was not portrayed as a violent act of self 
defense nor as violence rooted in significant and longstanding social grievances.  No, this 
was a “criminal” act performed by “Uygurs.”   
 The reality of what happened on the other side of the video is not as important as 
how it was packaged and interpreted.  Most of those who followed the violence of the 
summer of 2009 experienced a mediated version of the events.  News agencies, 
government spokespersons, and activists have woven images, sounds, and words into 
montages, endowed with meanings specific to their respective objectives.  The “facts” of 
the events recorded in the above video are that a few individuals beat two men with metal 
pipes.  How those facts were couched, and into what narrative they are inserted, have a 
greater effect than the facts themselves. 
 The above video could have had many titles.  The title could have been: “Uyghur 
Anger at Chinese Governmental Oppression Boils Over; Ethnic Han Caught in Crossfire.”  





might have been: “Xinjiang Security Forces Unable or Unwilling to Stem Ethnic 
Violence.”  Any number of titles could have been created for the same video.  This 
footage could be used to support or refute any number of narratives, but the video poster 
chose to focus on one of many variables that complicate Han-Uyghur relations.  This 
poster chose to focus on Uyghur “criminality.” 
 Furthermore, the video could have been altered in different ways.  The complete 
removal of audio, for example, would have changed the entire feel of the video.  For 
example, the absence of the audio which would remove the woman’s emotional 
responses might make the video more detached.  The visual sequences could also have 
been spliced differently in a way that would leave the viewer believing the men survived 
the attack.  The portion where the individual in the burke beat the man could have been 
removed itself which would have muddled the attribution of the violence to a Muslim.  It 
is also possible that those two “victims” had just finished killing a Uyghur, only to be 
discovered and killed in an act of revenge, but that this portion of the footage was 
deliberately not filmed, or spliced out of the final video product. 
 Instead, the audio, the visual sequences, and the title gave the video specific 
meanings, intended or not.  The meanings of this incident have been framed in ways that 
declare that Uyghurs are criminals.  Whether the video poster intended to frame the 
events in this manner or whether the frame was merely a reflection of the video poster’s 
bias, from the perspective of the viewer it is the same.   The viewer is exposed to a frame 
that portrays the Uyghur as a people that kill the innocent and fill ordinary Han neighbors 





 Many have a stake in how Han-Uyghur relations are portrayed, not the least of 
which the Chinese government or Rebiya Kadeer along with proponents for a Uyghur-led 
free Xinjiang or those advocating improved treatment of the Uyghur in China.  Except for 
those on the ground in Urumqi, all others experience Han-Uyghur strife through the 
framing of others, who have their own agendas or biases.  Interested parties use print, 
video, radio, and internet media to frame these problems in specific ways at times 
appealing more to the emotional understanding of the issues than the intellectual 
understanding of the same. 
 This study seeks to view the framing of Han-Uyghur relations and strife from the 
perspective of the nonestablishment as evidenced on the Internet, specifically YouTube.  
How do Chinese and English language using netizens3 understand the problems that 
surround the troubled Han-Uyghur relations and how do they present them in this unique 
medium?  Which issues dominate the narratives associated with Han-Uyghur relations on 
YouTube and do they corroborate what scholars have discovered using traditional 
research methods?   
 
YouTube as a Source 
 
 Why choose YouTube as a source of data?  YouTube is a rather singular type of 
media.  It is a website where nearly any type of video can be uploaded.  News clips, non-
professional homemade videos, violent footage caught by witnesses, or video clips of 
various entertainment programs to mention just a few. There are many other types of 
videos on YouTube but the aforementioned capture the main types of videos being 
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uploaded that are intentionally or unintentionally forming a debate on why Han-Uyghur 
relations are so poor.   
 YouTube videos are “living” documents.  These videos are being repeatedly 
accessed with many receiving new comment posts on a regular basis.  When possible, the 
author checked back with the videos he reviewed several weeks after re-accessing each 
video.  Many of the videos had up to a hundred new instances of access in a two week 
period, even though in some cases, the video has been uploaded two years prior.  It was 
found that, on average, the videos with the most instances of accessing had received new 
comments within the last four to five weeks, some within one to seven days.4  These 
videos do not collect dust even after years of shelf life. 
 The relevance of these videos is reaffirmed with each new accessing or comment 
post.  They are not going away like yesterday’s news and continue to have the possibility 
to influence new viewers with each passing day.  Additionally, the numbers of accesses 
can be much lower than the actual number of people that have seen a video.  A video 
with 22,000 instances of access, as some of the analyzed videos had, may have been seen 
by several people per instance of access as coworkers or family members gather around 
an office or den computer.  Finally, videos can be seen by one individual and then 
blogged about in other online and offline venues, making it impossible to define the 
limits of the influence of a single video to the access rate or number of comment postings 
alone.   
                                                          
4
 The author uses the term “access” as opposed to the YouTube term “viewing” deliberately.   YouTube 
uses the term “view” to indicate the number of times any computer accesses a particular video.  The 
accessing count, however, cannot indicate the actual number of individuals that view the video or the 
number of times they do so per access.  Once a computer accesses a video, the video can be played and 
replayed to any size of audience per viewing per instance of access.  It is for this reason that the author will 





 Getting at these issues surrounding Han-Uyghur relations, at least from the 
standpoint of those that represent the races themselves, can be difficult.  Regimes that 
have been traditionally restrictive on the freedom of expression can complicate the 
reliability of surveys.  In his assessment of a national survey conducted in 1993 in the 
PRC, Matthew Hoddie concluded that ethnic minority respondents were uncooperative 
and less forthcoming than were ethnic majority respondents, something that contrasts 
sharply with the minority experience in the U.S.  Hoddie maintains that PRC hostility 
towards minority activists has conditioned minorities to limit attention to their political 
views.5  There is also a case to be made that the Chinese government attitudes towards 
pointed criticism of the regime has blunted the level of openness and honesty from ethnic 
majority respondents participating in the same surveys. 
 A brief comparison between the source material that can be found on YouTube 
and what can be found on the Chinese variants Tudou.com and 56.com is instructive.  
The author preformed a cursory search using the same term used for this study of 
YouTube in both Chinese sites.  The types of videos posted and the commentary 
associated with them on both Tudou.com and 56.com differed greatly with those on 
YouTube.  As has been mentioned, videos on YouTube ranged from entertainment pieces, 
news from a variety of sources, homemade videos, as well as footage of Han-Uyghur 
violence in China.  56.com and Tudou.com had no such content.  The videos posted were 
almost exclusively entertainment.  There was practically no commentary whatsoever 
even though the commentary functions were enabled.  What commentary there was 
related only to the quality of the performance and had nothing to do with Han-Uyghur 
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 Matthew Hoddie, “Ethnic Difference and Survey Cooperation in the People’s Republic of China,” Asian 





relations or Chinese politics, which was prolific on the YouTube videos.  YouTube seems 
to represent a safe place to air and discuss these sensitive issues.  It is a place where 
Uyghur internet users, their supporters, as well as members of the Chinese YouTube user 
population can come and frame these issues in ways unthinkable on the Chinese sites.   
 Furthermore, YouTube is not an organized media source like CNN or the 
People’s Daily that edits all of its content to ensure it stays on a consistent message.  
YouTube is a place where anyone can post nearly anything in any way they want.  It is 
almost as if YouTube is a place where ethnic minority and ethnic majority “survey 
respondents” can come and answer questions that they pose to themselves unencumbered 
by the problems that Hoddie has concluded exists in the PRC.  
 It would be impossible to identify exactly what demographic of Chinese Internet 
users frequent YouTube, but some attempt at a generalization will be made.  Speaking 
directly to the question of the availability of these videos to the Chinese, they are largely 
not accessible inside of China.  While it is possible to circumvent China’s Great Fire 
Wall, it is difficult for the general public.  Therefore, speaking of individuals of Chinese 
descent, YouTube videos are accessible mainly to those that are living abroad.     
 Quantcast, a web analytics service, estimates that 36% of U.S. YouTube users are 
between the ages of 18 and 34.6  The same source estimates that 56% of U.S. YouTube 
users make over $60K a year; 50% of U.S. users have graduated college (to say nothing 
of high school education).  U.S. YouTube users, therefore, are young, educated and 
affluent.   Additionally, YouTube has a much higher concentration of Asian users than 
Caucasian users as compared to the Internet average as a whole.7  These statistics seem to 
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mirror the demographics of Internet users in China.  According to China’s “China 
Internet Network Information Center” (CINIC) 2007 report, over 65% of internet users in 
China are between the ages of 18 and 35.  Nearly 58% are single, over 80% have finished 
high school with nearly 52% possessing some college degree.  Nearly 33% are students 
and nearly another third are employees of an enterprise or business.8  China has a 
significant population living abroad, 35 million according to the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences.9  For the purposes of this study, it will be assumed that the Chinese 
YouTube users are young, educated, and upwardly mobile Chinese living abroad.  
Statistics suggest that the video posters share the same demographic category, but this 
cannot be concluded with a strong degree of certainty. 
 On the other hand, access to the Internet and to YouTube in particular among the 
Uyghur is very limited.  Of the estimated 9 million Uyghurs worldwide, around 8.4 
million live in China, mostly in Xinjiang.  From within China, their access to the Internet 
is poor simply because Xinjiang has a relatively low number of Internet users as 
compared to China as a whole.  According to CINIC’s report, only 7.7% of Xinjiang’s 
population are Internet users; the number of websites that Xinjiang hosts is 0.3% of the 
total number located in China.10  There are other measurements, but the bottom line is 
that Xinjiang’s internet infrastructure and the level of internet saturation is quite low.  
Furthermore, the Uyghur living there are poor and would have proportionally less access 
to limited internet resources than their Han counterparts.  The remaining 600,000 
                                                          
8
 "Statistical Survey Report on The Internet Development in China,” China Internet Network Information 
Center, 2007, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/download/2007/cnnic19threport.pdf. 
9
 "CASS report: number of overseas Chinese up to 35 mln," Embassy of the People's Republic of China in 
the United States of America, Accessed March 9, 2011, http://www.china-
embassy.org/eng/qwgz/t297510.htm. 
10





Uyghurs live mostly in the Central Asian States (CAR) where, as of 2005, only 3-9% of 
the population used the Internet at least once per week depending on the country in 
question.11  
 In short, there are very few Uyghur Internet users and even fewer Uyghur 
YouTube users.  Comments and video postings that tend to support Uyghur causes found 
in YouTube can reasonably be attributed to an extremely small population of Uyghurs 
living in areas such as Europe and the U.S. along with their supporters.  These, like the 
Chinese YouTube users, are young. 12 
 Finally, the YouTube video posters and those who add to the commentary appear  
 
to be the nonelite. Their misunderstandings of history, English spelling or misuse of  
 
Chinese characters, and their unprofessional use of expletives and grammar mistakes  
 





Han-Uyghur Contemporary Issues 
What are the issues that drive Han-Uyghur ethnic tension and violence?  Scholars 
have attributed these problems in part to Uyghur resistance to integrate into China’s 
national identity.  Uyghur difficulty in successfully integrating into China’s economy in 
part stems from their refusal to call themselves Chinese, and in part to the Han’s refusal 
to allow them to equally participate in the employment opportunities of China. 
Furthermore, the belief held by the Uyghur that their culture and religion are under attack 
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 “Internet Development in Central Asia and its Role as an Information Resource,” Organization For 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Last accessed February 13, 2011, http://www.osce.org/form/15678. 
12
 Attribution will only be attempted within these parameters and will be general in nature.  No attempt will 
be made to attribute a single video posting or a single comment to a specific demographic.  Rather, the 
general trends in postings and commentary content will be cautiously attributed to the above mentioned 





by the Chinese government is also unhelpful.  Scholars have highlighted Uyghur 
aspirations for more political autonomy, which range from a greater degree of self 
determination in a Chinese controlled Xinjiang to full-blown independence.  Finally, 
scholars point to racist-motivated views held by both the Uyghur and the Han, and the 
Chinese government’s insertion of violent Uyghur resistance into a narrative of terrorism.  
 Dru Gladney has focused on the impact the state has had on the formation of the 
Uyghur identity in the first place.  He has argued that the Uyghur identity is the result of 
a dialectical interaction between the Uyghur and the Chinese state, building upon an 
agreed on ethnonym-“Uyghur.”13  The Chinese state assigned this group of Turks living 
in Xinjiang the label of “Uyghur,” a label that had been out of use for 500 years, and 
which the Uyghur have subsequently adopted and used as a building block to 
strengthening a collective ethnic and national identity. 
 As other scholars have concluded, many Uyghurs refuse to identify themselves as 
Chinese nationals, which resistance takes many shapes.  Gardner Bovingdon has 
demonstrated that the Uyghur engage in representational politics and various forms of 
everyday resistance to defy their inclusion in the Chinese multiethnic state.  These 
measures include forming their own versions of Xinjiang and Uyghur history; colloquial 
language, often abusive, that alienates the Uyghur from the Han; and popular art forms 
such as poetry, jokes and songs, and other literary works.  All of these activities, 
Bovingdon argues, strengthen the collective Uyghur identity as well as their 
determination to remain separate from the Chinese “nation.”14 
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 Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 228. 
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 The Uyghur language is intimately connected with the Uyghur national identity 
and its resistance to be included in China’s national identity.  As Blaine Kaltman has 
discovered through a series of interviews conducted in China, Uyghurs with a good 
command of Mandarin (and a correspondingly poorer command of Uyghur) are looked 
down on by fellow Uyghurs.  They are either considered “sell outs” or are not real 
Uyghurs, at times derogatorily referred to as “Chinese Uyghurs.”15   
 Rebecca Clothey produced similar findings while conducting a series of 
interviews with minority students at the Central University for Nationalities (CUN) in 
Beijing, China.  Clothey determined that minority students who entered the university by 
testing in their native tongue felt that those other minority students who entered by testing 
using the Chinese language were not “real” minorities.  Clothey cites the phrase 
“fourteenth minority” which is used by Uyghurs to describe those Uyghurs that had 
strong Chinese language skills, a people that were not quite Uyghur or Chinese.  Clothey 
discovered that to a great extent, the minority students that tested in Chinese envied the 
native tongue language skills of those that tested in their native language and even felt 
looked down upon by those that had strong native language skills.16    
 Wenfang Tang and Gaochao found evidence that supported this link between 
language and ethnic identity in surveys they conducted in Chinese high schools during 
2006-2007.  They found that the Uyghur had a strong desire to learn the Uyghur language 
but a much lower desire to learn Chinese.  They further discovered that it was important 
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 Blaine Kaltman, Under the Heel of the Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime, and the Uighur in China (Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 2007), Chapters 2 and 3. 
16
 Rebecca Clothey, “China’s Policies for Minority Nationalities in Higher Education: Negotiating National 





for the Uyghur students to learn their language in order to preserve their cultural 
traditions.17 
 While poor Mandarin language skills strengthen a sense of Uyghur solidarity, 
they damage their chances to find well-paying employment, as Kaltman has argued.  At 
least from the perspective of labor efficiency, Han employers would rather hire a Han 
with strong mandarin skills than a Uyghur with whom he can barely communicate.  
Language, at least, is a barrier to upward mobility for the Uyghur, but their economic 
problems may run deeper, however.  The Uyghurs Kaltman interviewed felt 
discriminated against by the Han in that they believed that even with a good work ethic 
and the educational opportunities afforded them by the state, the Uyghur would still not 
have an equal chance at advancement in society.  Clothely reports similar sentiments in 
her interviews with Uyghur students who entered the university by testing in their native 
tongue.  These students reported being mistaken for foreigners off campus and felt that as 
Uyghurs, they were looked down on, particularly by the Han. 
In addition to economic disenfranchisement, the Uyghur feel politically 
marginalized as well.  The “autonomy” afforded them in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR) has not turned out to be very autonomous with the CCP 
maintaining tight control over politics in Xinjiang.  Additionally, the CCP has 
deliberately diluted Uyghur influence in decision making by appointing smaller minority 
groups proportionally more offices than are warranted by their ratio in the population.   
Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Beijing has successfully denied 
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 Wenfang Tang and Gaochao He, "Separate but Loyal: Ethnicity and Nationalism in China," East-West 





the Uyghur a government in exile, and has created a hostile environment in the CARs for 
runaway dissidents. 
 The Uyghur also face severe oppression from the police and judicial system.  
Crackdowns like “Strike Hard” have hit Uyghur communities hard.  Gladney has noted 
that even the judicial system seems set against the Uyghur because it has punished 
Uyghurs far more harshly than the Hui (another Muslim group in China) for involvement 
in protests against a book that detailed Muslim sexual customs.18  Justin Rudelson and 
William Jankowiak, however, have maintained that these harsh measures are part of a 
cohesive plan that utilizes both hard and soft policies in order to assimilate the Uyghur 
into the larger Chinese economy and political culture.  This is accomplished by punishing 
those that oppose the state and incentivizing the rest of the Uyghur population to integrate.  
Rudelson and Jankowiak emphasized that Han migration into Xinjiang is an essential part 
of these goals.19 
 According to Rudelson and Jankowiak, Beijing implements soft policies that have 
allowed hundreds of communist cadre who are ethnic Uyghur to go on Hajj, encouraged 
mosque construction, and supported the historical works of Uyghurs, as well as their 
inclusion in minority affirmative action policies.  At the same time, Beijing has employed 
hard policies designed to punish and discourage active dissidence from the state.  These 
have included police crackdowns on disaffected Uyghurs such as “Strike Hard, 
Maximum Pressure,” closing mosques, and clampdowns on historical literature that are 
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 Gladney, Dislocating China, 232. 
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 Justin Rudleson and William Jankowiak, “Acculturation and Resistance: Xinjiang Identities in Flux,” in 






too nationalistic.  Politically speaking, the Uyghur live in a capricious environment where 
yesterday’s policy is today’s taboo.   
 Though they are at times allowed some religious freedoms, they are as often as 
not denied them, which creates the impression that the state is actively attempting to 
destroy Uyghur religion and as a result, their culture.  As James Millward has pointed out, 
Chinese state restrictions on Muslim practice of religion have been implemented in a 
variety of ways from the Qing Dynasty down to the present.20  Frederick Starr assesses 
that many Uyghur have embraced Islam specifically because it sets them apart from their 
Chinese rulers.21 
 Rudelson and Jankowiak, however, have argued along a different line of thinking 
with respect to the subject of cultural annihilation.  They submit that in the last fifty years, 
the primary allegiance of Uyghurs has been to family, clan and locality, and not to the 
collective ethnic whole, and that the current Uyghur sense of collective identity is not as 
strong as some scholars assume.  Essentially, they argue that a strong sense of collective 
culture does not exist among the Uyghur. 
 However, they also maintain that of all the minorities, the Uyghur have the least 
to fear with respect to cultural assimilation.  They agree with Kaltman’s findings that the 
Uyghur do not marry outside their ethnic background, making them a more insular ethnic 
group.  Furthermore, they argue that the home, mosque, and to a certain extent, eating 
establishments are ethnic borderlands wherein the Uyghur, Han, and Hui do not mix.  It is 
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 James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Colombia University Press, 
2007). 
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 S. Frederick Starr, “Introduction,” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr 





for these reasons that they conclude that the Uyghur are the most culturally impenetrable 
of all minorities albeit with a somewhat fractured sense of self.   
 In contrast to this scholarship, Tang and He found that the Uyghur students they 
surveyed felt a high degree of affinity towards their Chinese national identity, more so 
than their fellow Han students.  The Uyghur students’ national identity score was 90 (out 
of 100), whereas the Han national identify score was 89.  The Uyghur had a much higher 
ethnic identity score of 96 as compared to the Han ethnic identity score of 80.  Tang and 
He compared the strength of national identity among ethnic minorities in both Russia and 
the U.S., finding that these minorities had much weaker affinity with their national 
identity than did Chinese minorities.  Tang and He conclude that there is a strong sense of 
loyalty to the Chinese state by minorities, including the Uyghur, but also a strong desire 
to be culturally separate from the majority. 
 Despite Tang and He’s findings, frustrated political aspirations of the Uyghur 
remain a problem area between them and the Han.  Gladney emphasized that by 
establishing an autonomous region in Xinjiang but denying the Uyghur true autonomy, 
the Chinese state has thus unwittingly provided itself as a counterpoint to Uyghur 
nationalistic aspirations while defining a basis for those aspirations.  Furthermore, by 
defining the geographic boundaries of the Uyghur autonomous zone, China has 
unwittingly drawn the geographic boundaries for the Eastern Turkistan Republic many 
Uyghurs want to establish.  Recalling Gladney’s argument that the Uyghur are to some 
degree indebted to the Chinese state for their collective identity, it is ironic to see that it 
has also provided the same with the contours of their political aspirations as well.  





Chinese state, calling for more modest measures that would promote truer autonomy, 
many want to establish an independent Uyghur-led state. 
 These political goals are fueled to some degree by a sense of separateness from 
the Han majority, which is derived from racist attitudes held by both Han and Uyghur 
alike.  According to the Kaltman’s interviews, the Uyghur see the Han as morally 
bankrupt.  Urumqi is seen as less safe now that it is more highly populated with Han 
immigrants who are perceived to be selling drugs, harboring desires to rob the Uyghur, 
and fueling an increase in prostitution.  Kaltman found that most Urumqi Uyghur 
residents believed that crime was a problem in their city, but they did not feel any 
concern that they would be the victim of a crime at the hands of another Uyghur.  
Conversely, Kaltman found that the Han viewed the Uyghur as a “fierce,” “unreasonable” 
people with a “primitive mentality” who are “apathetic to development.”  He found that 
the Han hold a common belief that the Uyghur are thieves and criminals.  
 Finally, terrorism is another problem that is complicating Han-Uyghur relations.  
Bovingdon has demonstrated that the Chinese government has deliberately inserted 
Uyghur resistance into the narrative of terrorism.  Just five months after 9-11, the 
government came out with a report entitled “Eastern Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot 
Escape Without Impunity.”  Bovingdon essentially argued that this and other reports 
repackaged years of protest activity as the deliberate acts of Uyghur terrorist 
organizations linked to Osama bin Laden.   
 Bovingdon maintained that this particular representation is out of sync with the 
record.  Bovingdon shows that since 1998, the numbers of protest events in Xinjiang have 





increased.22  Bovingdon argues that the violent nature of Uyghur activists has been 
exaggerated, especially in comparison with the rest of Chinese protesters.  Rudelson and 
Jankowiak have also touched on terrorism, arguing that the PRC has linked its anti-
terrorism campaign in Xinjiang with the U.S. War on Terror. 
 This scholarship has covered a lot of ground.  These scholars have interviewed 
Uyghurs attending state-run colleges, surveyed Han and Uyghur high school students, 
and interviewed hundreds of Han and Uyghur adults from several locations in China.  
They have also canvassed the historical record, Chinese government publications, as well 
as the contemporary writings of the Uyghur in order to understand Han-Uyghur relations.  
 This study of YouTube videos and their corresponding commentary has found 
that many of the issues identified in current scholarship are prevalent on the Internet as 
well.  There is an abundance of evidence that racist attitudes, contests of national identity, 
the status of Xinjiang, and a narrative of terrorism are problems that plague Han-Uyghur 
relations.  What did not appear strongly in the videos and commentary was a narrative 
detailing the oppression of the Uyghur by the Chinese state to include political, religious, 
cultural, and economic oppression.  This was most likely due to the search terms used to 
collect the evidence and not because these are not important issues themselves.  One 
strong trend in the source material that does not appear in previous scholarship is the 
tendency for Chinese language users to blame the Chinese government for the violence in 
Urumqi.   
 If there is a weakness in this scholarship it is that the prosecution of the source  
 
material has been largely determined by the scholars and less by the source material  
 
itself.  That there are issues evidenced on YouTube that are not in the current scholarship  
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such as Chinese users blaming the Chinese government highlight this weakness.  Using  
 
YouTube and the Internet as a source allows the individuals involved, the Han and the  
 
Uyghur, to have more influence on how the source material is addressed or generated.   
 
On the Internet, they answer questions that they themselves formulate.  These discussion  
 
threads can provide invaluable guidance on the types of questions the source material  
 
itself finds relevant.  This study hopes to show that YouTube corroborates much of what  
 
current scholarship has determined are the important issues that complicated Han-Uyghur  
 
issues in addition to providing direction for future research. 
 
 
Issue Framing and YouTube 
 Besides being viewed as answers to an open-ended survey or poll where the 
respondents, i.e., video posters and commentators, answer the questions they pose to 
themselves, the source material in YouTube can be viewed as a crude form of framing.  
This framing has the potential to influence the opinions of those passive viewers of the 
videos and commentary and the way they think about the source of ethnic strife between 
the Han and the Uyghur.   
 Often times there are vast differences between the actual factors involved in a 
contentious social issue and the way those factors are organized and presented to the 
public.  Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley have argued that by framing social issues in certain 
ways, the framers can define the causes, consequences, and even the remedies to those 
problems.23  They further remind us that framing can take very complex issues and 
oversimplify them into a problem caused by a couple of central factors. 
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 Framing differs from persuasion in important ways.  According to Nelson and 
Oxley, persuasion refers to changing the content of someone’s beliefs, whereas framing 
attempts to alter the relative importance one attaches to any given belief.24  Framers seek 
to categorize issues and proclaim what the core aspect of a specific issue really is. Nelson 
and Oxley maintain that framing influences opinion by identifying which of several 
potential conflicting considerations should predominate in the debate of a problem or 
issue.  Haider-Markel and Joslyn have argued along similar lines, suggesting that issues 
can present individuals with the dilemma of choosing between competing and 
inconsistent considerations.  Framing provides direction by suggesting which 
considerations are the most salient.25 
 The framing in the YouTube videos took place on at least two levels.  The first 
type of framing was accomplished through video and audio splicing as well as crafting 
the video titles.  The second type occurred in the commentary as the participants debated 
what they believed were the most relevant issues.26  Both types of framing, however, 
were crude and unpolished.  The videos largely appeared to be made by amateurs, each 
with their own unrefined techniques, opinions, and biases while the commentary 
articulated was by average people voicing their views.  
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 It is the premise of this author that these frames presented on YouTube have the 
potential, like frames in traditional news sources, to effect the way the YouTube users 
and their associates perceive and interpret the issues that surround Han-Uyghur relations.  
More importantly, while the actual YouTube content may largely remain on YouTube 
servers located outside of China, the opinions and frames expressed within that content 
have the real probability of spreading into China as overseas Chinese with access to 
YouTube communicate with relatives in China and as students with the same access 
return to China to visit home or to work. 
  
 
METHODS AND DATA 
 
 
YouTube Research Methodology 
 The quantity of videos posted on YouTube is enormous.  This paper did not seek 
to exhaust every video relating to this topic on YouTube.  Such a project would be the 
scope of a book, and would use multiple search terms in Chinese, Pinyin, English, 
Uyghur, and possibly other Turkic languages.  This project sought, in part, to test the 
possibility of such research on YouTube by addressing one small sliver of YouTube’s 
related videos.   
 The author chose to use the search term “维吾尔族” which is the simplified 
character version of the Chinese word that translates into “Uyghur.”  Using the Chinese 
characters as the search term ensured a larger concentration of commentary in Chinese 
characters.  A cursory check of returns on the English language search term “Uyghur” 
shows that these videos also have a good deal of political content, but little of the 
commentary occurs in Chinese.  Increasing the Chinese language content allowed some 
limited attribution, at least to opinions held by those literate in Chinese. 
 Search results on YouTube can be filtered by multiple factors such as volume of 
video accessing, date of post, viewer rating, categories the video was tagged under (i.e., 
entertainment, news and politics, etc), video duration, and others.  The author chose to 





based on “relevance.”  Search results filtered with this setting produced a greater variety 
of video type and accessing volume.  The commentary content and volume varied as a 
result. 
 Interestingly, some of the videos with the highest commentary rates had relatively  
 
small accessing rates. For example, one video with a total of 6,151 views at last access  
 
had generated 105 comments, or approximately 1 comment per 58 views.  Another video  
 
had far more views-123,606 at last access-but not a corresponding increase in comments.   
 
This video had 584 comments, the largest commentary set of all videos examined.  The  
 
accessing-comment rate for this video was 1 comment per 211 views.  The above  
 
mentioned video with a smaller viewer rating had over 3.5 times the per-accessing- 
 
commentary as the video with a much larger viewership rate.  The bottom line is that  
 
filtering videos in YouTube by number of views would have precluded some videos that  
 





General Description of Collected Results 
 The search term produced an estimated (by YouTube) 1,270 videos of which the 
author accessed the first 500 videos, less than 100 of which had relevant commentary.  Of 
the approximate 100 videos, the author selected 61 videos to examine more carefully.  
Generally, these videos had the highest commentary volumes and should be considered a 
convenient sample.  These 61 videos represent, at the last time of access, 770,993 
instances of access and 4,250 posted comments.  These numbers are still growing as 
almost all of these videos are still available on YouTube and are constantly being viewed 





most recent on March 19, 2010.  Of the total selected videos, 41% were news clips, 26% 
were music and dancing, with 16% containing footage of violence purportedly in either 
Guangdong or Urumqi during the summer of 2009.  In the following breakdowns, no one 
video was counted more than once. 
 The type of videos affected the volume of commenting and accessing.  Videos 
that resulted in 100 or more comments, hereafter referred to as “extensive commentary 
videos,” were primarily footage of violence (50%) or news clips (43%).  The average 
number of access instances was just over 35,000 (the lowest being in the 6,000 range and 
the highest up to 123,000; the average number of comments was 218 comments (Figure 
2.1).   Videos with relatively moderate commentary (41 to 99 comments), hereafter 
referred to as “moderate commentary videos,” were primarily news clips (50%), CCTV 
programming (17%), and violent footage (17%).  The average number of access instances 
was over 14,600 views; the average number of posts was 60 comments (Figure 2.2). 
Videos with the most limited number of commentary (1-40 comments), hereafter 
referred to as “nominal commentary videos,” were videos of music and/or dancing (43%) 
and news clips (37%) (Figure 2.3).  Amateur videos, video segments, or news pieces that 
were not professionally produced or were firsthand footage of the 2009 violence 
composed 7-11% of all three commentary categories.  One tentative conclusion can be 
made based on these dispositions: footage of violence and news clips drive online 
discussion of issues surrounding Han-Uyghur relations. 
 The commentary took place almost exclusively in three scripts: English, 
simplified Chinese characters, and traditional Chinese characters.  The use of a specific 






Figure 2.1 Extensive Commentary Video Disposition 
 

































Figure 2.3 Nominal Commentary Video Disposition 
 
does not mean “Uyghur supporter,” simplified Chinese does not mean China mainlander  
(or an overseas Chinese person from the mainland), and traditional Chinese characters  
does not denote the commentator is from Taiwan.   
 
General Description of Collected Results Continued 
 Some computer programs or computers default to one Chinese script or another.  
Some computers are not uploaded with Chinese script, forcing a person with Chinese as 
his or her primary language to comment in English.  The only conclusion that can be 
made is that if the comment was made in a Chinese script, then the person most likely 
had a command of the Chinese language.  The same applies to English language 
commentary.   
 Finally, it is important to note how out of sync the commentary could be with the 
type of video on display.  Generally speaking, videos of traditional Uyghur dances 




















half of such videos contained commentary refuting the notion that the Uyghur were 
Chinese.  These videos contained commentary regarding the concept of a multicultural 
China, the identity of the Uyghur, Xinjiang sovereignty, and to a much lesser degree 
Xinjiang terrorism and other topics.  There does not seem to be a correlation between the 
type of video and the type of commentary.   
 It is as if dialogues occurring at kitchen tables, classrooms, and other offline 
venues, or even inside the heads of the YouTube users themselves, are suddenly 
evidenced on YouTube in response to “triggers,” which are seemingly the YouTube 
videos and associated content itself.  YouTube can be seen as an online window into 
discussions that are taking place offline.  YouTube videos are the pretext to discuss 
serious issues that are at times completely unrelated with the video itself.  It is for this 
reason that the analysis of this study will largely restrict itself to the video titles and the 




UYGHUR NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
 
The Uyghur in Multicultural China 
 Turkish music fills the blackness as purple lighting slowly brightens to reveal a 
large group of female dancers, all dressed in red.  The dancers all hold their pose as the 
camera focuses on two dancers isolated from the rest on the right hand side of a dance 
floor, who begin to dance.  On the left hand side of the video image appears the 
characters “土豆网”, a signal to the viewer that this video has been uploaded from 
China’s Tudou.com website.  Eventually, the entire group of women dances to the 
Turkish music and offstage vocals, which are presumably Uyghur with some portions in 
Chinese Mandarin.  Nearly six minutes into the presentation, the dancing slows, the lights 
dim, and the music fades into the background. 
 The video is entitled “走向远方（维吾尔族 女子群舞)” or “Heading Toward a 
Distant Place (Uyghur Women Group Dancing).”  What is interesting here is not the title, 
the content of the video, or even the intent with which the YouTube user posted the 
video.27  The important detail is the one and only comment posted to this video which 
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was simple but full of meaning.  Wrote the commentator: “dancers are all han Chinese.”28  
What was the commentator getting at?29 
 What could have precipitated such a response and why was it made?  It appears 
that the commentator is engaging in his own version of representational politics.  There is 
a very good chance this commentator was rejecting the right of the ethnic Han to interpret 
or portray the ethnic Uyghur or their customs.  “Who gave the Han the right to perform 
our dances?” is what the commentator appears to take issue with.  This situation was 
played out on separate videos with separate commentators who responded to similar 
videos of Uyghur traditional dancing by asserting that the dancers were all Han or at least 
not Uyghur, or that the dancers were incapable of dancing because of not being Uyghur.   
 At its core, this is not really about dancing or the authenticity of a single cultural 
presentation.  The larger and real issue here is identity.  Is the Uyghur cultural tradition 
part of the larger Chinese cultural tradition?  Are Uyghurs and Han part of a shared 
national identity that would allow members of either ethnicity to represent a Uyghur 
dance, because at its core it is really a Chinese dance? 
 The appropriateness, even the reality, of a multicultural China was intensely 
disputed on the commentary portions of these videos.  In some ways, this issue is the 
foundational piece of other frames, the key concept that either transforms rioters in 
Urumqi into freedom fighters, criminals, or terrorists.  In extensive commentary videos, 
over a third of all videos had commentary providing support for the idea that all the 
ethnic groups in China are in fact nationally “Chinese” while retaining their ethnic 
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identity; most of these came from commentators using Chinese characters.  When the 
videos are taken as a whole, nearly a quarter had at least one comment making roughly 
this claim.   
 There was much more contention over the specific argument of whether the 
Uyghur ethnic group was nationally Chinese or not.  Nearly 93% of the extensive 
commentary videos had commentary that asserted that the Uyghurs were Chinese.30  
Nearly 52% of the moderate commenting had commentary that asserted that the Uyghur 
were Chinese with 27% of nominal commentary videos having at least one comment 
asserting the same.  In many cases, these videos had many more than one comment 
making this claim, most of which occurred in Chinese. 
 Only 21% of these types of extensive commentary videos contained comments  
 
disputing the notion that Uyghur’s were Chinese.  None of the moderate commentary  
 
videos contained the same, but 28% of the nominal commentary videos had at least one  
 
comment that disputed the idea.  This should not be interpreted as a sign that the Uyghur  
 
or their supporters care less about their national identity than Chinese speakers do.  These  
 
lower results may be due to the language composition of the returned results due to the  
 
search term used.  This notwithstanding, it is clear that the national identity of the Uyghur  
 




 Videos involving the young Uyghur boy Erafat sparked similar debates over the 
issue of whether Uyghurs are Chinese or not.  Erafat is, or was when the entertainment 
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pieces were performed, a young Uyghur boy, possibly around the age of eight, who 
performed various song and dance pieces in Mandarin Chinese.  Many YouTube videos 
of Erafat were originally performed for CCTV and then later uploaded onto YouTube.   
 YouTube commentators argued back and forth about the identity of Erafat as a 
medium to discuss the national identity of the Uyghur.  To some, his Mandarin language 
skills were incongruous with his background as a Uyghur.  Here is evidence of the 
language issues that Kaltman and Clothey have identified as being crucial to the Uyghur 
national identity.  Erafat defies the Uyghur ideal by maintaining excellent Mandarin 
language skills.  He creates tension within the Uyghur ranks because he represents what 
Kaltman and Clothey have identified would be considered a sell-out to the Uyghur 
community, precisely because he speaks Mandarin so well.   
 To the other YouTube commentators, Erafat’s language skills, and indeed mere 
existence, highlighted the validity of the Chinese multicultural national identity.  To these 
commentators, Erafat was ethnically Uyghur and nationally Chinese, a symbol of every 
other Uyghur in China. 
 It would take too long to canvas all the Erafat videos (there are at least 193 Erafat 
videos on YouTube alone), but these at least show that even benign videos seemingly 
dedicated exclusively to entertainment can elicit weighty words.  Erafat’s dance routines 
carry ideological baggage that viewers readily see, contest, or defend.  To some, he is a 
symbol of multicultural China and the fact that the Uyghurs are indeed Chinese. To 








 During these disputations, both sides of the arguments denigrated each other in 
ways that portray the other as less civilized, even less than human.  Uyghurs were 
referred to as “dregs,” “dogs,” “savages,” “bedbugs,” “trash,” “radical extremists,” 
“terrorists,” “prostitutes,” “whores,” “beasts,” “criminals,” “low class,” as well as other 
even courser terms.  They were portrayed at times as a people that are morally bankrupt.  
In 78% and 77% of the extensive commentary and moderate commentary videos, 
respectively, the Uyghurs specifically, or Turks generally, were denigrated in some 
fashion.   
 The Chinese were also vilified, being called “pigs,” “inhuman,” “cowards,” 
“barbarians,” “criminals,” “communist bandits,” and of course, a “people with no culture.”  
In the extensive commentary and moderate commentary videos, Han specifically or 
Chinese in general were disparaged in some fashion on at least one occasion 64% and 46% 
of the time, respectively. This name-calling from both sides was consistent throughout 
the commentary and not isolated to singular statements on a few videos.  These 
occurrences lend support to Bovingdon’s conclusion that the use of abusive colloquial 
language by the Uyghur at the Han casts doubt on ethnic harmony and solidarity in China.  
These are online expressions of what Bovingdon found offline in his interviews. 
 Arguments have been made that attempt to blame Internet verbal violence on the 
Internet’s ability to provide a netizen with anonymity.  Referencing research on English-
language internet newsgroups that demonstrated that verbal violence, or “flaming,” was 
not as common as first believed, Guobin Yang has built on this line of thinking by 





are discussed.  To use Yang’s words, “Crises of communication are rooted in crises of 
community.”31   
 The use of violent language in these particular YouTube videos does not 
necessarily demonstrate that the commentators are crude people that seized an 
opportunity to lash out at the “Other” behind the veil of anonymity.  Rather, this language 
demonstrates how passionately the commentators feel about the issues as well as the 
depth of this particular “crisis” of the Han-Uyghur “community.”  After all, many of the 
commentators had just watched a brutal killing. 
Unfortunately, there were also calls for violence that would extend beyond the 
verbal on both sides of the debate.   Using a variety of violent terminology, commentators 
called for acts of violence to include genocide in most commentary sections of the 
extensive and moderate commentary videos.  Calls for violence directed at Uyghurs 
occurred in 71% of the extensive commentary videos and occurred in 54% of the 
moderate commentary videos.  Averaging the two, a full quarter of the videos contained 
calls for violence directed against Muslims.  Concerning violence directed at Han or 
Chinese, 50% of the extensive commentary videos contained some call for violence with 
the same occurring 23% of the time in the moderate commentary videos. 
 For the part of those that verbally denigrate the Uyghur, or call for their actual 
demise, what is occurring here is a failure to really accept the Uyghur as “Chinese.”  
Could “savages” and “beasts” be considered Chinese?  If the Uyghurs are uncivilized, 
then they are clearly not Chinese, much less if they are not even human.  These 
participants are implicitly denying the Uyghur entry into the great Chinese culture and 
                                                          
31
 Guobin Yang, The Power if the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online (New York: Colombia 





nationality, demonstrating cultural and conceptual fissures in the idea of what it means to 
be “Chinese.”   
 These brands of commentary point to a gap in the current scholarship.  To what  
 
degree do the Han actually believe that the Uyghur belong in the Chinese national 
 
 identity?  Does the Han sense of Uyghur belonging extend beyond what is necessary to  
 
justify continued control over Xinjiang?  These commentaries hint that the Han may not  
 
believe the rhetoric of a harmonious multi-ethnic nation as much as previously assumed.   
 
Herein we can see some of the utility in using YouTube as a tool to further refine and  
 
narrow traditional interview and survey projects. 
 
 
Uyghur National Identity and Framing 
Uyghur national identity really is a core issue upon which other issues and 
determinations hinge.  The legitimacy of PRC control of the area known as Xinjiang 
depends on whether the Uyghur are nationally Chinese or not.  If they are not, then there 
is a theoretical case for saying that Xinjiang is an “occupied territory” that should be 
returned to the Uyghur.  The corollary is also true; if the Uyghurs are nationally Chinese, 
then the territory they inhabit is also Chinese. 
National identity, however interpreted, also affects how one interprets Uyghur 
violence.  If the Uyghurs are really Chinese nationals “rioting” in the streets and 
“attacking innocent civilians,” then the state is justified in meeting this with violent 
measures of their own, now legitimized to the populous at large.  When, however, 
Uyghurs are framed as non-Chinese strangers in their own land, then Uyghurs become 
the victims.  Indeed, it becomes much easier to describe them as “freedom fighters” 





crackdowns are not viewed as legitimate responses to violent unrest, rather they could be 
considered further abuses perpetrated by a tyrannical regime.  In many ways, the national 
identity of the Uyghur is a lens through which many key issues are seen. 
Finally, from the perspective of the Uyghur, these commentaries provide 
supporting evidence to what other scholars have concluded regarding Uyghur national 
identity.  Here we see the online versions of the everyday resistance Bovingdon writes of, 
strengthening the Uyghur sense of separateness from the Chinese state.  The racist 
attitudes Kaltman found in his interviews are replicated in the YouTube commentary on 
both sides of the equation.  The important link between language and ethnic identity that 
Clothey identified is also evidenced in the source material.  These commentaries also 
suggest that Beijing’s concept of a multicultural Chinese national identity do not have the 
deep roots it claims among both the Han and the Uyghur, Tang and He’s research 
notwithstanding.  As such, they point to additional research needs, hitherto unaddressed.  
In these ways, YouTube compliments traditional research methods by pointing them in 
new directions and corroborating their conclusions.
  
LAND, HARD POLICIES, AND UYGHUR CRIMINALITY 
 
 Three other issues that one would expect to appear in the commentary based on  
 
the current scholarship are the issues of whether Xinjiang should be a part of China (part  
 
and parcel to some Uyghur’s ambition for complete independence), whether or not the  
 
Uyghur are oppressed by China’s hard policies, and the notion of Uyghur criminality.  
 
 Xinjiang political status is featured prominently in the commentary, as is Uyghur  
 





Eastern Turkistan or Xinjiang? 
 A group of Chinese people gathered on a city street shouting and waving small 
Chinese flags at a few others who appear to be holding small flags of another nationality.  
The others leave and the shouting ceases; the Chinese people mill around.  The video is 
spliced and suddenly shows the Chinese people converging to wave and shout at a 
woman walking down the street clad in a Tibetan flag.  The woman waves the flag above 
her head as she walks off.  The video is again spliced, shifting to a scene of the Chinese 
shouting “中国! (China) China! 中国! China!”  They are yelling at other individuals 
carrying or waving the Tibetan flag.  One of these individuals shouts back “Viva Tibet! 
(Long Live Tibet!).”  The shouting peters out and the video ends.32 
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 Ironically, this video was entitled “HAN CHINESE RULE THE WORLD, 
UYGHURS, URUMQI, XINJIANG.”  This particular poster has only uploaded two 
videos, both having the exact title.  Whatever the content of the actual video, the real 
point seems to be encapsulated in the title itself: Xinjiang is a part of China.  The timing 
of this video is also relevant.  Whenever the events portrayed in the video took place, the 
video was posted to YouTube on July 10, 2009.  Besides being a declaration of Han 
dominance, this video appears to be seeking to participate in the riots and protests of July 
2009, albeit virtually. 
 Closely linked with the argument of what it means to be Uyghur is the contested 
status of Xinjiang.  Roughly two-thirds of the extensive and moderate commentary 
videos contained some challenge to the notion that the area of Xinjiang is a part of China.  
Nearly half of the same videos had commentary that made the assertion that it was a part 
of China.  These types of commentaries were usually found on videos of violent footage 
or news clips.  Additionally, there were 57 instances in all the commentary of the words 
“Eastern Turkistan,” “Uyghurstan,” or some variation of the same.   
 Predictably, there was quite a bit of commentary affirming Chinese control of 
Xinjiang.  Demonstrating the preoccupation of another potential division of China, there 
were 68 instances of the word “split” (or splittist) in both English and Chinese throughout 
the commentary.33  Some of those preoccupied with affirming Chinese sovereignty over 
Xinjiang appealed to history to support their claims.  These comments were by no means 
entirely historically accurate, but all would cite some historical “fact” highlighting the 
illegitimacy of Uyghur assertions of sovereignty over Xinjiang or to bolster the PRC’s 
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claim over the same.  It seems clear that the politically motivated histories of which 
Bovingdon writes are being consumed and subsequently being re-represented (or 
misrepresented) on YouTube.   
 This indicates a bleed-over effect of intellectual ideas.  Chinese nationalism-
motivated or PRC-sponsored histories of Xinjiang are being spread outside of China on 
the Internet to defend China’s territorial claims.  This is a two way street, however.  
Whoever is propagating these versions of history are also exposed to the other ideas and 
frames being aired on YouTube and can spread them in the same circles where they were 
first exposed to the histories. 
 Some commentators pointed to demographics in Xinjiang to refute Uyghur claims 
to sovereignty of Xinjiang.  Wrote one in simplified Chinese Characters: “The thing I 
can’t stand the most is to have some exiled Uyghur dogs suddenly start claiming 
everywhere that all of Xinjiang belongs to the Uyghur.  They are completely carried 
away!  They not only seem to have forgotten the Han right in front of their eyes, but also 
the Hui of east Xinjiang and the Mongols of the northern Zunghar!”34  Embedded in a 
historical argument, another individual asserted that the Uyghurs only constitute 40% of 
the population of Xinjiang.   
Those that opposed Chinese control of Xinjiang were much less articulate in  
 
expressing their views.  These expressions of defiance were largely confined to slogans  
 
like “EASTERN TURKISTAN!!!!” and other variations.  Expressions like this  
 
encapsulate the general level of articulation of Uyghur political aspirations.  This was  
 
probably due to the search term used.  It is very likely commentary that opposed Chinese  
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claims of sovereignty, or expressed other more moderate political goals, would be much  
 
more thoroughly articulated had videos been found using a Uyghur or English language  
 
search term.  It is very likely that the commentaries negating Chinese control were  
 
informed by the alternate histories of Xinjiang propagated by pro-Uyghur intellectuals  
 
that Bovingdon has alluded to.  These ideas are not being incubated in a vacuum, and this  
 
study postulates that research conducted in Uyghur on YouTube would find striking  
 




 Quiet mystical music accompanies majestic vistas of the Kunlun Mountains in 
Xinjiang.  Xinjiang’s natural and manmade beauties are shown from above revealing 
stunning landscapes.35  Buddhist art along with ancient indigenous rock and cave 
carvings present themselves to the viewer.  The music changes to a much more upbeat 
tone as colorfully clad minorities smile as they dance or engage in traditional economic 
activities.  Children happily run down a street beside what appears to be a mosque.  The 
viewers are then taken to the grasslands of Xinjiang where an unidentified group of 
minorities engage in traditional equestrian games.  Clean yurts and a woman dressed in a 
gown of deep red and snow white twirls for the camera.  Men in richly colored minority 
traditional clothing smoke in the lush green fields or teach their youth the art of playing 
customary instruments. 
 Golden fields of grain grab the attention of the viewers as they are taken on a 
journey of agricultural discovery.  Ample melons and plump fruits are harvested by 
colorfully dressed minorities.  An oil rig slowly pumps oil from the well in front of the 
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backdrop of a beautiful sunset.  Wind farms, industrial plants, and manufacturing 
factories highlight Xinjiang’s booming economy.  Minority merchants happily peddle 
their wares in Urumqi.  Overhead views of the city and its highways and fast-forwarded 
clips of pedestrians give the impression of a bustling city.  Uyghur dancers in exotic 
costumes light up Urumqi’s nightlife.  A firework display set over a bridge spanning a 
beautiful river concludes the video as the music fades. 
 This video was entitled "[beautiful_china] Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 
新疆维吾尔自治区," and like its title suggests, displays Xinjiang from its most attractive 
vantage points.36  This is a nine-minute section of a much larger CCTV9 program.  There 
is no audio other than the music, but the scenes are complimented with English subtitles.  
CCTV9 is CCTV’s English language programming channel, and this program seems 
designed to communicate ideas central to the Chinese government’s framing of Xinjiang 
and its peoples. 
 This video highlights one of the frame dichotomies-are the Uyghur oppressed in 
China or not?  The above video appeared designed to give the overall impression that the 
non-Han peoples of Xinjiang, to include the Uyghur, are happy, thriving, and not 
oppressed.  Even the herdsmen living in remote areas of Xinjiang have the cleanest and 
brightest of traditional clothing, showing that not only are they doing well economically 
but were also afforded the freedom to live in traditional ways. One is left to wonder, 
“How can the Uyghurs claim to be oppressed when they have a vibrant economy, 
beautiful unexploited landscape in which to live, and freedom of cultural and religious 
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expression?”  There is no evidence of the hard policies Rudelson and Jankowiak 
reference. 
 One might expect claims that the Chinese government was abusing the Uyghur 
people to be ubiquitous in the commentary, but this type of commentary is very sparse 
indeed.  There should have been a lot of commentary on China’s mosque closings, police 
crackdowns, and restrictions on Uyghur expressions nationalism.  This was the biggest 
omission in the source material.  Chinese oppression, or hard policies directed at the 
Uyghur, were mentioned only 96 times throughout the commentary.37  This pales in 
comparison with the frequency of key terminology usage of other issues.   
 This issue was best articulated by apologists that attempted, albeit infrequently, to 
argue that the Uyghur were, if not well treated in China, treated better there than they 
would be in the U.S. or in Arab nations.  These commentators cited restrictions of 
freedom of religion in the Arab world, affirmative action measures in China (ironically), 
and vague assertions that the Uyghur would be treated terribly in the U.S. 
In particular, one homemade video maintained that the minorities were better off 
in China as a result of the economic development the minority areas have received.  The 
video, named "uighurs ,xinjiang- china treat them not bad," maintains that the Aborigines 
of Australia and the Eskimos of Canada and other minorities have benefited from the 
economic development provided by their governments.  The implication was that the 
benefits the Aborigines and Eskimos enjoyed were paralleled in China among the 
“indigenous” population-the Uyghur.  Predictably, the assertions of this video were 
contested even though there had been less than 700 instances of accessing.   
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 So Uyghur oppression did emerge in the commentary and videos, but very  
 
infrequently and largely among Chinese apologists rather than angry Uyghur supporters.   
 
The author postulates that a study conducted in the Uyghur or English language would  
 
produce entirely different results.  Limitations in English or Chinese language abilities  
 
probably had more to do with this omission than Beijing’s implementation of hard  
 
policies in Xinjiang not being a salient issue.  The comments made by the apologists are  
 
evidence in-and-of themselves that it is an issue.  The author concludes that these  
 
commentary strings do not invalidate earlier scholarly work, and that a more  
 
comprehensive search of YouTube using the Uyghur language would uncover evidence  
 




 Soft piano music provides the backdrop of a series of slides depicting petty 
thieves robbing pedestrians.  The voice of a young man asks “Look, if you had one shot, 
or one opportunity, to seize everything you ever wanted, in one moment, would you 
capture it, or just let it slip?” The man’s voice is replaced by a rap song, in what could be 
a Turkish language and later in English that continues to provide the beat for a continuing 
stream of images of pick pockets and the profiles of alleged Uyghur thieves.38 
 This video is entitled “Uygur thieves ！！！維吾爾小偷在合肥 (Uyghur Petty 
Thieves in Hefei).”  The implication, of course, is that all the images are of Uyghur 
thieves.  The amount of commentary that focused on Uyghur criminality was staggering.  
There were 386 key word references to crime, the largest being thievery.  It seemed an 
accepted fact among most of the commentators that addressed Uyghur criminality that the 
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Uyghur people as a whole are thieves.  Commentary that addressed Uyghur criminality 
did not attempt to explain the problems surrounding Han-Uyghur relations.  Rather, it 
was spread throughout the language of other commentary.  This does not mean, however, 
that this language does not have significant potential effects in framing. 
It is hard to sympathize with a thief, and whether there are numerous Uyghur 
thieves or not is beside the point.  “Uyghurs are thieves,” is a powerful generalization that 
makes it difficult to empathize with the Uyghur’s current predicament.  Their poverty, 
after all, must be a product of their criminal tendencies, right?  The broad generalization 
that portrays the Uyghur people as thieves is a de-facto frame.  It is a frame of Han 
victimization at the hands of Uyghur criminals.  Uyghur “indignity” to Xinjiang, or 
Uyghur poverty and economic disenfranchisement must take a back seat to other more 
important considerations. 
There is also evidence that YouTube videos can “activate” the potency of certain 
ideas that have hitherto been rejected.  Consider the following example.  After accessing 
a YouTube video of a news report on the 2009 Uyghur violence, one commentator using 
simplified Chinese characters declared: “I am Han, and have never rejected other 
nationalities.  However, from now on I am going to change.  After f***ing your mom, the 
moment I see a Xinjiang thief I am going to beat him to death.”39   
Assuming we can take this individual at his word, the individual had no issues 
with the Uyghur until “witnessing” the ethnic violence in Xinjiang through the medium 
of a YouTube video.  After experiencing the violence virtually, the individual had a 
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radical change of heart.  This is suggestive that for good or for ill, YouTube videos have 
the potential to polarize the issues surrounding Han-Uyghur relations. 
Important to this discussion is the use of the epithet “thief.”  It appears that this 
individual readily adopted the slur after changing positions, whereas before it seemed to 
hold no salience in the individual’s thinking.  The notion that Uyghurs are thieves may 
now pepper this individual’s discussion of Han-Uyghur relations and place paradigm 
restraints on the way this individual conceptualizes the issues.  This individual appears to 
have been “framed.”  Finally, these findings in these videos and associated commentary 
also lend support to Kaltman’s findings that the Han commonly view the Uyghur as 
thieves and criminals-an online expression of what Kaltman discovered offline.
  
CAUSALITY AND PROGNOSTICS 
 
 The image of a street comes to life from what is probably an exterior security 
camera; there is no sound.  On the top right hand side of the screen, the numbers appear 
“2009-07-05 20:53:45”; the bottom left hand corner has the words “通道八,” or 
“Thoroughfare 8.”  Two to three dozen people roam the street.  Suddenly they spot a 
vehicle traversing the area and force it to come to a stop.  They begin beating the car with 
their feet, hands, and some unidentifiable object that appears to be made of wood.  In a 
bid for escape, the car backs up quickly but is forced to the side of the street by the 
roaming people who recommence attacking the car.  There must be fifty people now 
crowding to join in on the violence.  Several have metal pipes and the front windshield is 
virtually destroyed.   An official-looking vehicle with lights installed on the front top of 
the vehicle appears and the mob backs away from the car, but the ambulance continues 
on its way leaving the area. 
 A man carrying a body scurries across the street as the mob returns and attempts 
to dislodge the vehicle’s driver from the car.  The driver, a male, makes one last attempt 
to move the car away from the scene before giving up and attempting an escape through 
the empty space that was his front windshield.  A pedestrian crosses the street, but not 
before she looks both ways for traffic.   
 The driver falls back into the car, is removed from the driver’s side, and is then 
subjected to a brutal beating with the metal pipes that have already destroyed his car.  





man attempts to crawl away into the middle of the street but the mob follows and the 
beating continues.  Finally, the body lies still and the mob leaves it to bleed in the street.  
It took two minutes from the time that the man accidentally arrived at that street before 
his body lay mutilated and bleeding on the ground, dead.  The camera zooms in on the 
destroyed car; its windshield wipers move up and down, swatting the empty air and the 
last piece of broken windshield.  A woman inspects the damage of the car, picks up a 
pipe and throws it in the direction of the body, now off screen.  She laughs with the 
others. 40 
 This video produced a firestorm of commentary, one of which centered on the 
ambulance that left the scene of a brutal beating without offering assistance. Improperly 
identifying the ambulance as a police vehicle, indignant Chinese speakers wonder angrily 
why the police chose to leave the scene of the crime.  This assumption was later corrected 
by those that recognized the vehicle as an ambulance.  
 The commentary here is angry, but some of the anger is directed at the Chinese 
state, or organs of it.  One commentator using simplified Chinese characters bemoaned 
that no one will protect them and that they had to depend on their fists to punish the 
rioters.  Wrote one commentator in simplified Chinese characters:  
…The police are nowhere to be seen.  If the police can control the video 
camera long distance then why can’t they come and put a stop (to the 
incident).  Did they really go to protect the big government buildings?  
The people depend on you and you behave like this? I’m so mad! 
 
 Another demanded an investigation be brought against the police officers 
presumed to be inside the ambulance that did nothing.  The commenter wondered why 
they did not offer assistance.  Did they not see what was occurring?  Were they scared, or 
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were they simply indifferent to the beatings?  The commentary continued condemning 
the police, the government’s weakness, and even its ethnic policies.  
 Commentaries that blamed some portion of the Chinese government were a 
common thread that persisted in all types of videos, though almost entirely within news 
clips and violent footage.  The government was, as one might expect, not the only entity 
blamed for the violence and the interethnic problems between the Uyghur and the Han.  
The Uyghur, Islam itself, terrorism, the Chinese people, and even the West or their media 
were all blamed for the problems.   
 It is in this commentary where Han-Uyghur ethnic strife diagnostics occur and  
 
with that, the implied or explicitly articulated prognostics on how to fix the problems.   
 
Through the following assignments of blame come the perceived needed changes that  
 
will resolve these problems, at least according to YouTube users. 
 
 
Blaming the Chinese Government 
 As has been stated, the Chinese government was blamed for the Uyghur-Han 
ethnic tensions and the violence between the two groups.  This type of commentary 
breaks completely with what is known according to current scholarship.  In 78% of 
extensive and moderate commentary videos, some aspect of the Chinese government was 
blamed for these problems.  Indeed, between the extensive and moderate commentary 
videos, 41% of such videos criticized China’s ethnic policy relative to the “Uyghur 





that related to China’s ethnic policy or to a broader discussion of the government’s 
handling of minorities.41   
 Criticism of the Chinese government’s handling of the Uyghurs broke out into 
three basic concerns, the first being that the government was coddling the Uyghur with 
their affirmative action measures.  The second was that the police or judicial system was 
too soft or lenient on Uyghur criminality, and the third saw all the conflict as a 
consequence of Chinese governmental oppression on both Han and Uyghur alike.  
 To some Chinese language users, the Uyghurs were given too many privileges 
allowing them to defy laws, human and divine.  In 42% of the extensive and moderate 
commentary videos, there were comments indicating that the Uyghurs or minorities were 
the recipients of special privileges.  In almost all cases, this was resented or seen as a 
problem.  In a slightly humorous tone, one commentator using simplified Chinese 
characters delineated a class system in China which typified the main thrust much of this 
type of commentary: 
港台人为一等人 (Hong Kong and Taiwan residents -1st Class) 
维吾尔，藏族人为二等人 (Uyghurs and Tibetans-2nd Class) 
其他少数民族为三等人 (All other minorities-3rd Class) 
汉族在大陆是四等人 (Mainland Hans-4th Class)42 
The second large issue that many commentators had with the Chinese government 
was their belief the Chinese legal and judicial system was mishandling Uyghur violence 
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and crime.  In 57% of the extensive commentary videos, there were some expressions 
that the police were being too soft or lenient on the Uyghurs.  The angry commentary 
raged that arrested Uyghur criminals were being released without being charged, that the 
police were neglecting their duties towards Uyghur crime, and that the police were unable 
to protect the population.  The following comment made in simplified Chinese characters 
was representative of much of this type of commentary: 
Brothers, you all know that the Uyghur thieves are evil. If you come to the 
mainland you will know that in every large city in China they all have these 
beasts that steal things.  In order to protect the minorities, the police will 
not dare arrest them.  If you go to stop them from stealing on the streets it 
will be you that gets beaten…43 
 
 The third issue suggested that these conflicts were a product of CCP oppression 
that negatively affected both the Han and the Uyghur.  This was a much smaller group of 
commentary that essentially argued that there was nothing inherently wrong between the 
two groups and that the ethnic problems they suffered were created, in one way or 
another, by the Chinese government. 
 There are several ideas going on here, but one large overarching frame-it is all the 
government’s fault.  Either the government is too indulgent, too lenient, or too oppressive; 
regardless, the government is to blame.  That the Chinese government would be 
implicated as a source of the trouble for one reason or another is not new.  The notion 
that overseas Chinese would blame the Chinese government for being too generous to the 
Uyghur and thus create or aggravate Han-Uyghur strife seems to be a new idea.44   
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 There are important potential implications with this tentative conclusion.  First, to 
the degree with which the views of these young, educated, and upwardly mobile 
individuals of Chinese descent represent the views of their corresponding demographic in 
China, it could indicate that there is dissatisfaction with current ethnic policy in China 
and that future outbursts of violence may be attributed not only to “unruly” Uyghurs but 
also to an “incapable” or “apathetic” central government.  This could pose a threat to the 
legitimacy of the CCP if it is perceived to be mishandling minority issues at the expense 
of the Han majority by the next generation of influential and educated citizens.   
 Second, with respect to prognostics, the Chinese government is criticized for 
being too lenient and indulgent of the Uyghur.  This frame demands that the government 
crack down on the Uyghur and restrict the affirmative action measures they enjoy.  If the 
perceived cause of Han-Uyghur strife lies with the government, then so does the 
perceived solution-some change is deemed as necessary with the Chinese government or 
its ethnic policies. 
 Third, as we have seen from some of the commentary and the videos themselves, 
digital content and the ideas associated with them are not static.  They move across 
geographic and political boundaries.  Just as historical assumptions make their way from 
China to YouTube, as shall be seen in the commentary that addresses the ideal status of 
Xinjiang, so could determinations of the cause of Han-Uyghur ethnic strife make their 
way from YouTube to China.   
 To what degree this idea has taken hold in the minds of viewership of these 
videos, it is impossible to say.  One can cautiously argue that the potential for these ideas 





commentary contained comments that blamed the Chinese government in some way for 
the ethnic strife, mostly made in Chinese characters.  These videos reached a total of over 
582,000 “accesses” as of the last time the author checked the videos.  While one cannot 
measure effect, one can speak to some degree about the potential for impact, and the 
potential for these ideas to influence the thinking of the young overseas Chinese is great.   
 Finally, these commentaries also point to a whole new line of research.  New  
 
interview sets and surveys could be geared around the question that attempts to ascertain  
 





Blaming Terrorism and Islam 
 The following comment, in its entirety, appeared in response to a video footage 
portraying alleged Uyghur violence in Urumqi: “muslim=terrorism.”45  It exemplifies the 
type of commentary that demonstrates a poorly articulated notion that somehow Han-
Uyghur ethnic strife was the fault of terrorists and Islam, which sometimes appeared to 
be the same thing.  Very few commentators expressed any concrete idea that blamed 
these problems on Islam or terrorism.  Rather, just like in the case of Uyghur criminality, 
terminology implicating Islam was woven into the language of other arguments. 
 Roughly a third of extensive and moderate commentary videos placed the blame 
on either terrorists or splittists, words that were used at times interchangeably.  Words 
relating to terrorism appeared 232 times throughout the commentary.46  Nearly 43% of 
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the extensive commentary videos contained some attribution of blame to Islam.  This 
occurred far fewer times in the other videos with less commentary.  Religious terms 
(especially Islamic terms) appeared 699 times throughout the commentary.47   
 Clearly, there is a fixation with terrorism and the Muslim faith and how that 
impacts Han-Uyghur relations.  As Rudelson, Jankowiak, and Bovingdon have reminded 
us, the Uyghur have been deliberately inserted into the narrative of terrorism.  The 
commentary in the YouTube videos is suggestive that the rhetoric has been successful in 
determining how Han-Uyghur relations are framed.   
 This type of framing does not lend itself well to groups of people with serious 
social grievances.  For instance, terrorists do not have social injustice grievances, just 
radical ideas they intend to violently enforce.  Broad acceptance that the Uyghur are 
terrorists could very well lead to broad acceptance of heavy-handed measures 
implemented to deal with the “terrorists.” 
 The preoccupation with Islam is also unhelpful.  Connecting Islam in general with 
alleged Uyghur acts of violence in specific and the vague idea of terrorism in the 
background will do nothing to engender tolerance in or outside China.  Uyghurs are 
understood by some to be violent specifically because they are Muslim.  This type of 
causality determination can only lead down a troubling road of unhelpful prognostics.  If 
the problem lies with Islam, than curtailing Islamic activities in some way is the logical 
outcome. 
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Blaming the Uyghur, the Chinese, and the West 
 As one would expect, the Uyghur and the Chinese were generally blamed as the 
source of Han-Uyghur ethnic strife.  Two-thirds of extensive and moderate commentary 
videos contained commentary accusing the Uyghur; in nearly 42% of the extensive the 
moderate commentary videos, there was some blame placed on the Chinese (or Han) 
people themselves.  
 The West was blamed in a variety of capacities in these videos and their 
 
 accompanying commentary.  The main culprits were the West and in particular the  
 
Western media and the U.S.  As one individual wrote in simplified Chinese characters,  
 
“The Han-Uyghur contradiction is because your gang will oppose the CCP regardless of  
 
everything and support Kadeer’s scheme of Xinjiang independence and splitting up  
 
China which was created by the American dogs.”48  There were other theories aired that  
 
implicated the West, the most outlandish being that the “Uyghur criminals” were backed  
 




 Equally important to who was blamed for these problems was who, or what, was 
not blamed.  Below is a chart that attempts to determine which issues were the most 
salient for the YouTube commentators that participated in the videos, and which were not.  
Religion is the single most frequent word grouping (Figure 5.1).  As has been noted 
before, the lines blurred between religion and terrorism and if tallied together would 
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Figure 5.1 Key Word Group Frequency 
constitute over half of all key word instances. The second most relevant topic was 
Uyghur criminality followed by China’s ethnic policy.  The status of Xinjiang and the 
mistreatment of the Uyghur come in last place.  Islam, Uyghur criminality and terrorism 
seem to dominate the rhetoric.  What do not dominate the rhetoric are the issues of 
Uyghur poverty, cultural preservation, nor the hard policies adopted by Beijing.   
 There was almost no mention of Uyghur poverty as a source of the problems that 
face the Uyghur and Han.  Almost nothing was said about the language difficulties the 
Uyghur’s face and how that impacted their ability to successfully integrate into China’s 
economy.  Kaltman’s observations between language and economic success are largely 
ignored in the commentary.  Issues of cultural preservation were not generally raised.  
Han migration into Xinjiang highlighted by Rudelson and Jankowiak is largely absent as 
well.  While racism and negative generalizations are evident in the commentary, this 























 As a result, the commentary did not suggest or imply that the Uyghur should be 
helped to become effective bilingual citizens.  There was little mention of how the 
Uyghur could effectively integrate with the economy while maintaining a strong sense of 
cultural identity.  In short, most of the suggested or implied solutions from the causalities 
discussed would mean more crackdowns and more restrictions for the Uyghurs without 
addressing the issues that scholarship has identified as being central to the problems that 
surround Han-Uyghur relations.  This is not to say that the current scholarship has 
misidentified the core issues; rather, this search, which centered on a term in Chinese 







 The issues that fuel Han-Uyghur ethnic tensions are real and serious.  They are 
also a matter of life and death, a fact to which many of the videos could attest.  YouTube 
has been able to contribute to our understanding of these issues.  In many cases, the 
YouTube evidence supported what scholars have already concluded; however, in the case 
of Tang and He, it refuted their findings.  YouTube also shed light on lesser understood 
issues pointing to future research needs. 
 Contrary to Tang and He’s findings, this study supports Bovingdon’s assessment 
that many Uyghur reject the Chinese national identity that the Chinese government 
wishes them to adopt.  Contention over Uyghur national identity appeared over and over 
again in the YouTube commentary, with numerous rejections of the notion that the 
Uyghur were nationally Chinese surfacing in the most benign of videos.  The obsession 
with this issue seemed so strong that it was brought up no matter how incongruous it may 
have been with the actual video content. 
 The link between language and identity that Kaltman and Clothey discovered 
became apparent in the commentary as well.  The young Uyghur boy Erafat’s Mandarin 
language skills highlighted this connection.  His deviation from the “ideal” of having 
poor Mandarin language skills caused consternation among some because his linguistic 





other commentators who pointed out that it was natural for a Uyghur to speak Chinese 
since he was nationally Chinese.  Additionally, the tone of the commentary and some of 
its content suggest that the professions notwithstanding, the Han may not actually 
embrace the Uyghur as a member of the greater Chinese culture and consequently, 
Chinese identity.  Further research might be undertaken to assess to what degree the Han 
embrace the notion of a multicultural nation that includes the Uyghur. 
 Questions of national identity are intimately linked with questions of land.  Hence, 
the status of Xinjiang was pronounced in the commentary as well.  Those supporting a 
China-controlled Xinjiang articulated their views through historical narratives, accurate 
and inaccurate, and a preoccupation with splittists.  Those that advocated an Eastern 
Turkistan were much less articulate, something probably attributable to the language of 
the search term used rather than signifying a lack of commitment to that ideal.  Evidence 
of discontent with Beijing’s hard policies aimed at quelling resistance to Chinese rule in 
Xinjiang, and discontent with other alleged forms of oppression against the Uyghur, were 
conspicuously absent in the commentary.  This author presumes this to be another issue 
that would be more pronounced in the commentary if a Uyghur language search term was 
used to produce the data set. 
 Justification for Beijing’s hard policies can be found through Beijing’s narrative 
of terrorism, which Bovingdon has highlighted.  The commentary suggests that these 
rhetorical tools have been adopted by the nonelite and are used to largely to bolster other 
arguments.  Allusions to terrorism and Islam were woven into the discussions of other 
issues found in the commentary.  Like the rhetoric of terrorism, the rhetoric of criminality 





believe the Uyghur to be thieves were substantiated by a great deal of commentary in the 
Chinese language to that effect.   
 This study also alluded to the potentiality that the Han majority in China are 
dissatisfied with their government’s ethnic minority policy.  There was a great deal of 
commentary accusing the government of treating the Uyghur too generously and skewing 
the legal and judicial system in their favor.  In the words of one commentator, the Han 
are “Fourth Class Citizens.”  Further research should be undertaken to ascertain to what 
extent this sentiment is shared among the Han majority. 
 This research also points to problematic issue framing, which is occurring on a 
segment of the internet with a potentially large reach.  The framing identified on these 
videos tends to ignore some of the key issues that could produce helpful prognostics, 
such as finding meaningful solutions to Uyghur poverty, bridging the language divide, 
and blunting  some of Beijing’s hard policies.  Instead, many of these frames focus on 
Uyghur criminality and their escapes from justice as a result of misguided government 
policies.  These frames are delivered in the rhetoric of terrorism, tainted with racism, and 
with a preoccupation with Islam, which is seen as dangerous.  All of these frames trend 
towards solutions that would exacerbate Han-Uyghur relations, not help them.   
 Finally, it is hoped that this project can be seen as a case study for how the  
 
Internet can serve as a complimentary source to traditional sources.  There was a great  
 
deal of corroboration of evidence that occurred in this study.  YouTube and other Internet  
 
sites have the potential to serve in the same way for other research topics.  This study has  
 
demonstrated new avenues for research based on content found in YouTube but not in  
 






nontraditional tools to find research gaps that could be later filled using traditional  
 
sources.  Internet research has the potential to form an important symbiotic relationship  
 
with traditional research. 
 
 
YouTube as a Source 
 This study is as much about Internet methodology, YouTube in particular, as it is 
about the Uyghur and Han.  So far, no clear methodology has been identified that would 
allow consistent and meaningful research to occur on a site such as YouTube.  This study 
addressed this methodological gap and in so doing was able to tease out, though not 
entirely solve, some of the methodological problems associated with the Internet, namely 
attribution, data filtering, quantitative analysis, and language. 
 Research on the Internet is riddled with problems of attribution.  How does one 
know when one can attribute an Internet blog, comment posting, or video posting to an 
individual in particular or to a certain demographic?  Ultimately, one cannot make any 
definitive attribution.  Just as an email from a “twenty-year-old girl” may be from a forty-
year old man, so a comment from a “Uyghur” may be from an ethnic Han.  Thus any 
approach to the Internet must be done on a large scale.   
 In particular, attribution is meaningless, but in mass and in large numbers, some 
attribution can be made when a general trend in statements (made through blogs, 
comments, videos etc.) can be associated with user demographics as ascertained by 
Internet metric research.  Due to problems with attribution, Internet research will 
probably struggle to produce stand-alone conclusions.  This study certainly does not 





 Internet sources can compliment traditional sources, however.  Earlier scholarly 
work on Han-Uyghur relations largely depended either on personal interviews or surveys, 
all attributable, but all located in China.  Face-to-face interviews present almost no 
difficulties with respect to attribution, but can face challenges with openness and honesty, 
more especially when conducted in countries known for restrictions on the freedom of 
expression.  Internet sources, while they struggle with their own set of problems, 
attribution not the least, have the potentiality to provide “respondents” that are more open 
and honest, precisely because attribution is so difficult to ascertain.  When conclusions 
from traditional sources are corroborated by Internet sources, confidence in the original 
conclusions is strengthened because of the “limitations” of Internet sources.  It is hoped 
that this study has shown just that with respect to current scholarship on Han-Uyghur 
relations.   
 Data filtering can be a nightmare on YouTube.  How does one filter all the videos 
on YouTube?  This one search term, “维吾尔族,” produced an estimated 1,270 video 
results.  Any large project would involve multiple search terms in the three most relevant 
languages-Uyghur, English, and Chinese.  This could produce thousands or tens of 
thousands of video results, never mind the commentary.  Since one cannot review them 
all, how does one chose the videos to review and why?   
 Each filtering format in YouTube has its advantages, each allowing for different 
kinds of research.  For instance, if one wanted to understand the kind of videos posted 
around the events of the summer of 2009 (this really could be applied to any topic), one 
could filter by date of video posting.  Of course, the researcher would have to accept that 





occurred on videos posted prior to that time.  One could try to understand what types of 
videos were the most relevant to a particular topic by filtering based on “view count” (or 
access count as I would have it).  This, however, would also preclude “low access density” 
videos that have their own data returns as the author has attempted to demonstrate.   
 This line of thinking could continue, but suffice it to say that the ease with which 
data can be filtered allows researchers to quickly determine what data out of voluminous 
quantities will be most relevant to their research question, but there is always a cost.  One 
can never quite filter the data in such a way that allows them to only get what they need 
and exclude the rest.  Filtering, while allowing a researcher to manage large quantities of 
data, will invariably filter out some of the Internet content a researcher needs for a project.   
 These lessons are also applicable to the Internet.  The World Wide Web really is a 
web.  It is large, unwieldy and provides almost too much information.  Any rational 
research will require intelligent and deliberate filtering of one kind or another. 
 Quantitative analysis can be difficult to accomplish using YouTube as a source 
precisely because the “respondents” are not all being asked a preformulated set of 
questions.  When the respondents ask all of the questions, which can differ from video to 
video, the “survey” results become unstructured and messy.  While traditional surveys or 
interviews can produce meaningful statistics, it becomes extremely difficult to do so with 
YouTube because the respondents pick which questions to ask and which questions to 
answer.  
 The author has attempted to deal with this problem in two ways.  First, the author 
attempted to chronicle the frequency at which certain issues appeared among the video 





some sense as to how often an issue was raised and identified as important to the 
respondents.  Secondly, the author quantified the number of times key words, which were 
grouped by issue, appeared in the body of the commentary as a whole.  This provided a 
means by which the author could ascertain which were the most salient issues or ideas as 
determined by the respondents.  One word of caution: while the author attempted to 
quantify the numbers while allowing for misspellings, he undoubtedly missed some of 
the more egregious spelling errors.  Doubtless, methodology, or technology, will improve 
over time and identify better ways to quantify the data. 
 More differences between traditional surveys or interview sets and an 
unstructured Internet source are identified here.  Traditional means allow for better, more 
meaningful quantitative analysis than did YouTube, though with YouTube, some limited 
analysis can be accomplished.  On the other hand, YouTube was not limited by the 
rigidity of questioning that makes meaningful quantitative analysis possible.  The line of 
questioning was not limited to the researcher’s understanding of the problems, biases, or 
research needs.  It was only limited by the understanding of the “respondents” themselves.  
Another weakness of YouTube, and of the Internet at large, became a strength.  The very 
reason quantitative analysis on the Internet is so difficult is precisely the reason that 
makes Internet source material so authentic.  Researchers can leverage the authenticity of 
the Internet to hone their own work.  Commentaries found on YouTube, for example, can 
point scholars to new lines of research, and help them ask different kinds of questions in 
interviews or surveys than have been asked before, this time with the benefit of 





 Language was another issue with which this project struggled.  The Internet now 
provides a place where source material on specific issues is available in many different 
languages as social problems truly become global discourses.  Among the sixty-two 
videos, the author found commentary in simplified and traditional Chinese, English, Thai, 
Arabic script, and presumably Uyghur.  The videos were also in multiple languages, 
though almost entirely, as the search term would suggest, in Chinese.  The language 
capabilities of the researcher allowed him to process the Chinese, Thai, and English, but 
not Arabic script or Uyghur.  A cursory check of results using the English equivalent of 
the search term showed that a comprehension in Spanish would also be necessary.  
 If this project were to be expanded in a way that would be able to provide more 
comprehensive and meaningful results, it would by nature need to be a collaborative 
effort as it is highly unlikely that one researcher would be competent in all the languages 
that would appear in the source material.  For the same reasons that the Internet is 
connecting people from many different backgrounds as they discuss social issues, the 
global nature of the discourse may force researchers into collaborative ventures as the 
only way to adequately deal with the source material. 
 In some ways, the Internet is providing unique ways for eye witnesses to tell their 
stories.  Recall the video footage of Han-Uyghur violence caught on the video recorder, 
transmitted outside of China and uploaded onto YouTube.  That may have been the 
eyewitness’ only way to tell their story.  Other such stories must also be on YouTube, 
waiting to be found and told.  Researchers will find themselves having to follow their 






 The ground is shifting under the feet of those seeking to understand contemporary 
social issues of any nature.  New types of sources are now available online, and they are 
occurring in many different languages in volumes that are staggering.  The more 
networked the world becomes, the more digitized the source material will be.   
 To some degree, the digitization of source material makes it perishable.  Should 
YouTube or other Internet sites go bankrupt, or suffer an electronic attack that 
compromises the content in its servers, the source material simply goes away.  These 
videos are not hardcopy books, ledgers, or chests of microfiche that can be content to 
collect dust in a library until found and used.  While the Internet is likely to be a 
persistent force in the world for decades to come, there is no guarantee that any particular 
website or web service will survive technological or social change.  YouTube, like other 
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